A matter of trust
As a lawyer, it’s clear to me that the state can only act as the law requires – and I am confident that if I consult the law, I will understand (nearly) everything about what a particular authority does and why. If I were an engineer, I would be in a better position to understand why it’s still possible to drive through the Gotthard Road tunnel despite the fact that concrete fell from the ceiling last September. As an ordinary citizen, I have to admit that I often have to trust those who know more than I do, such as the Federal Roads Office in my example.
So, with the state, I understand some things on my own, but not others. But there always has to be someone who can explain the state’s actions to me. What about the secret services? These services are sometimes accused of being like a “state within a state” because certain activities must not be made public, as if they had a power that no other authority has. As a matter of fact, this power of secrecy is no small matter.
Looking at what the intelligence services actually do, it’s clear that the maintenance of secrecy is used first and foremost as a working tool. If the intelligence services could not use covert means and methods in certain contexts, their actions would be useless.
«Of course, as the saying goes, with great power comes great responsibility.»
Of course, as the saying goes, with great power comes great responsibility. Who can guarantee that this right to secrecy will not be abused for fraudulent or selfish purposes such as greed or the pursuit of power?
Swiss legislators have long been aware that this type of power must be subject to robust controls. Parliament’s Control Delegation in particular has been dedicated to the oversight of intelligence service activities since 1992. Legislators successfully expanded their oversight by establishing an independent supervisory authority as part of the new Intelligence Service Act, which was adopted in 2015 and approved by voters in a 2016 referendum.
Nearly all Western democracies have opted for a combined oversight of their intelligence services by a parliamentary body and an independent authority. It provides intelligence services with legitimacy, as they are subject to double oversight. They are thus supervised on the one hand by a parliamentary body representing a wide political spectrum with whom citizens can identify and, on the other hand, by experts such as those I head, who are presenting their work to you in this report.
The intelligence services and the Federal Roads Office have little in common – except that they both rely on trust. The intelligence services need the trust of the public in order to carry out their duties, and the public need the intelligence services in order to benefit from a certain level of security.
«The supervision of the authority I head involves monitoring complex and sensitive activities, identifying their risks or failures, as well as making recommendations on how to improve. As a supervisory authority, we cannot disclose all the secrets of the intelligence services, but we can examine and report on them to a certain extent.»
The supervision of the authority I head involves monitoring complex and sensitive activities, identifying their risks or failures, as well as making recommendations on how to improve. As a supervisory authority, we cannot disclose all the secrets of the intelligence services, but we can examine and report on them to a certain extent.
In light of all this, the Independent Oversight Authority for Intelligence Activities is pleased to present its annual report – so that every citizen can assess whether they can have confidence.
I hope you enjoy reading the report.
Prisca Fischer, Head of OA-IA
